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RIGHT OF A STATE TO RESTRICT EXPORTATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES
By W. LEwis ROBERTS*
The Constitution gives Congress power to regulate commerce among the several states.' The recent decision in the
Schechter case 2 emphasizes the fact that this power of Congress
extends only to regulation of transactions which are directly
part of interstate commerce and not to matters that are indirectly connected withi such commerce. That raises the question
as to how far a state may go in preventing its products from
entering into interstate commerce. Can it forbid the exportation of its natural resources ?
The purpose of giving Congress this power has been stated3
by Air. Justice McKenna in West v. Kansas Natural Gas (o.
The state of Oklahoma had enacted a statute designed to prevent the exportation of natural gas from the state by denying
the power of eminent domain and the privilege of using the
highways of the state for building the necessary pipe lines. In
conside'ring whether a state has the power to conserve to its
own people such a natural resource as natural gas, the learned
judge said: "If one State has it, all States have it; embargo
may be retaliated by embargo, and commerce will be halted at
state lines. And yet we have said that 'in matters of foreign
and interstate commerce there are no state lines.' In such
commerce, instead of the States, a new power appears and a
new welfare, a welfare which transcends that of any State. But
rather let us say it is constituted of the welfare of all of the
States and that of each State is made the greater by a division
of its resources, natural and created, with every other State,
and those of every other State with it. This was the purpose,
as it is the result, of the interstate commerce clause of the Con* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; A. B.,
Brown; A. M., Pennsylvania State College; J.D., University of Chicago; S. J. D., Harvard University.

Author of various articles in

legal periodicals.
Article 1, Sec. 3, Clause 3.
2A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States (1935)U. S.-55 Sip. 0t. 837.
3 (1911), 221 U. S. 229, 255; 31 Sup. Ct. 564.

KENTUCKY LAw JouRNAL

stitution of the United States. If there is to be a turning backward it must be done by the authority of another instrumentality than a court."
In the Schechter case the court pointed out that where the
effect of intrastate transactions is merely indirect, such traisactions remain within the domain of the state. An indirect
effect upon interstate commerce was not enough to give Congress control. "The precise line," the chief justice said, "can
be drawn only as individual cases arise, but the distinction is
clear in principle." He also stated that the fact that the local
regulation tended to cut down the volume of interstate commerce would not necessarily render the regulation invalid.
The late Mr. Justice Holmes took a definite stand in favor
of a state's right to control the exportation of its natural
products in his dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia. 4 In that case the state of West Virginia attempted to
withdraw a large volume of natural gas from the supply sent
through pipes to other states and to give preference in its use
to its own citizens. The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Van Devanter in speaking for the
majority of the court quoted with approval the language of Mr.
Justice MeKenna in West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. Mr. Justice
Holmes based his dissent on the fact that the statute in question
sought to reach natural gas before it had begun to move in commerce. "I think," he said, "that the products of a state until
they are actually started to a point outside it may be regulated
by the state notwithstanding the commerce clause........ "I
see nothing in the commerce clause to prevent a State from giving a preference to its inhabitants in the enjoyment of its natural advantages. If the gas were used only by private persons
for their own purposes I know of no power in Congress to require them to devote it to public use or to transport it across
state lines."s
It is submitted that the position of Mr. Justice Holmes seems
sound when he says that the products of a state until they are
actually started to a point outside the state are not in interstate
commerce and therefore not within the regulatory power of
5

(1923), 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658.

upra,n. 4, p. 602.
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Congress, granted by the commerce clause. In view of presentday tendencies to extend national control, it seems worthwhile
to review the decisions of the courts that have any bearing on
the question of the right of a state to regulate the exportation
of its natural resources, and see whether the position of the majority can be vindicated.
FsH u
Gxm
The question whether a state could prevent the transportation of fish and game caught or killed within its borders, to
points outside the state, did not arise until late in the nineteenth
century. This may be accounted for by the fact that in the
earlier days there was an abundance of fish and game to be found
on vast areas of wild land, and there was little or no market
value for them. There was also a lack of means for rapid transportation. The earliest reported cases are State. v. SaundersO
and Territory v. Evans.7 The first was decided in 1877 and the
latter in 1890. In the first the validity of a Kansas statute forbidding the transportation of prairie chickens from the state
was questioned and the court held it void on the ground that
it was an attempt of a state to regulate interstate commerce. In
Territory v. Evans, a territory statute to prevent the exportation of fish from the territory was held void on the ground that
it was a regulation of commerce between the states:
The leading case on the subject of transporting fish and
game beyond the borders of the state in which they are reduced
to possession, is Geer v. Connectieut,s decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1896. The statute under consideration in that case made it a criminal matter to have in possession for the purpose of transportation beyond the state, game
lawfully killed within the state. In overruling State,v. Saunders
and Territory v. Evans, the court said that the reasoning controlling the decision of those cases was inconclusive, "from the
fact that it did not consider the fundamental distinction between the qualified ownership of game and the perfect nature
of ownership in other property, and thus overlooked the authority of the State over property in game killed within its confines,
19 Kansas, 127.
12 Idaho, 634, 23 Pac. 115.
8 (1896), 161 U. S. 519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600.
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and the consequent power of the State to follow such property
into whatever hands it might pass with the conditions and restrictions deemed necessary for the public interest." As this
language shows the Court sustained the Connecticut statute on
the theory-that ownership of wild game is in the state in trust
for inhabitants thereof and that the state has the right under its
police power to preserve game as a food supply. Mr. Justice
White stated in his opinion that "the source of the police power
as to game birds flows from the duty of the State to preserve
for its people a valuable food supply."
This power in his
opinion was sufficient to warrant a state in retaining for its
citizens articles of food which are acquired in a qualified way
and "can never be the object of commerce except with the consent of the State and subject to the conditions which it may
deem best to impose for the public good." Since the state has
the right to forbid killing game, it can qualify its permission
to kill. It can permit the killing subject to the condition that it
shall not be transported beyond the state lines. Mr. Justice
Field dissenting, said that "when any animal, whether living
in the waters of the State or in the air above, is lawfully killed
for the purposes of food or other uses of man, it becomes an
article of commerce, and its use cannot be limited to the citizens
of one State to the exclusion of another State."
The case of Geer v. Connecticut seems to have settled the
question as to the right of a state to fix the conditions under
which fish and game may be taken. Since that decision, statutes
restricting The taking of fish or game for transportation outside
the state have been upheld in every case. 9 Prior to Geer v.
Connecticut there had been similar decisions in state courts. 10
Acts forbidding having game in possession during the closed
season are upheld, although they deprive a person from in9

McDonald v. Southern Express Co. (1904), 134 Fed. 282; ex parte
Fritz (1905), 86 Miss. 210, 38 So. 722 (fish); Cameron v. Territory
(1906), 16 Okla. 634, 86 Pac. 68 (game birds); Wells, Fargo & Co.
Express v. State (1906), 88 Ark. 571, 115 S. W. 385 (game fish); Carey
v. South Dakota (1919), 250 U. S. 118, 39 Sup. Ct. 403 (wild ducks);
Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Zellerback (1932), 124 Cal. App. 564, 12
Pac. (2d) 961 (fish).
oState v. Northern Pac. Exp. Co. (1894), 58 Minn. 403, 59 N. W.
1100 (fish); Magner v. People (1881), 97 Ill. 320 (quail); Organ v.
State (1892), 56 Ark. 267, 19 S. W. 840 (fish).
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porting game killed in another state,"1 and also acts making it
an offense for carriers to have possession of deer, unaccompanied
by owner. 12 A state has been held to have the same power over
fish and game brought within its borders as it has over fish and
game found within its limits. This right is supported under a
federal law known as the Lacey Act.' 3 A California statute
prohibiting the shipping by parcel post of wild game was held
not to unlawfully interfere with interstate commerce even though
game could be lawfully shipped out of the state if other means
were used.' 4 Statutes requiring license fees of those engaged
in exporting lobsters from the state1 5 and in packing oysters
for sale or transportation 6 have been sustained. A state tax on
fur and hides of wild animals captured under permission of
the state and intended for shipment to other states, however,
was deemed a burden on interstate commerce and therefore invalid.' 7 Also a California statute forbidding exportation of
abalone shells outside the state was bad,' 8 and a similar statute
in Louisiana which forbade the exportation of shrimps from
which the heads and "hulls" or shells had not been removed,
was void. The purpose of the act was to keep the shrimp canning business within the state of Louisiana.' 9 None of these
three cases involved the right of a state to conserve its food
supply. The first was an attempt to tax an interstate industry
and the last two were attempts to build up the industries of the
states involved. The enforcement of the last statute would have
forced the removal of a canning factory from the state of
Mississippi to Louisiana.
TAXATION CAsES
States have made use of the taxing power to accomplish the
object sought in these last three cases as well as to derive a

"New York v. Hesterberg (1908), 211 U. S. 31; Eager v. Jonesboro & C. Express Co. (1912), 103 Ark. 288, 147 S. W. 60.
"People v. Fargo (1910), 137 App. Div. 727, 122 N. Y. S. 553.
"Eager v. Jonesboro & C. Express Co., supra n. 10.
"Re Phcedavius (1918), 177 Cal. 238, 170 Pac. 412.
5State v. Dodge (1918), 117 Me. 269, 104 Atl. 5.
1State v. Applegarth (1895), 81 Md. 293, 31 Atl. 961.
"Lacoste v. Department of Conservation (1924), 263 U. S. 545, 44
Sup. Ct. 186.
"Ex parte Florence (1930), 107 Cal. App. 607, 290 Pac. 652.
"PFoster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Hoydel (1928), 278 U. S. 1,

49 Sup. Ct. 1.
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revenue from interstate commerce. In an early case in Michigan,
a tonnage tax was imposed on all iron ore or minerals exported
before smelting. Ores smelted within the state were exempted
from the tax. The object clearly was to keep the smelting
business within the state. The court held the statute invalid
as a burden on interstate commerce.20 Likewise a state statute
requiring the payment of a license fee on buyers of wheat for
interstate shipment and also imposing certain regulations as to
grading, inspection, etc. has been deemed invalid as a burden
on interstate commerce. 21 A Pennsylvania statute levying a tax
on all anthracite coal mined within the state was sustained,
although the evidence showed that eighty per cent of the coal
coming under the tax was shipped to other states. 22 In meeting the contention that this was a tax on interstate commerce,
Mr. Justice McKenna said: "If the possibility, or, indeed, certainty of exportation of a product or article from a State determines it to be in interstate commerce before the commencement of its movement from the State, it would seem to follow
that it is in such commerce from the instant of its growth or
production, and in the case of coals, as they lie in the ground.
The result would be curious. It would nationalize all industries,
it would nationalize and withdraw from state jurisdiction and
deliver to federal commercial control the fruits of California
and the South, the wheat of the West and its meats, the cotton
of the South, the shoes of Massachusetts and the woolen industries of other States, at the very inception of their production or growth, that is, the fruits unpicked, the cotton and wheat
ungathered, hides and flesh of cattle yet 'on the hoof', wool
yet unshorn, and coal yet unmined, because they are in varying
percentages destined for and surely to be exported to States
other than of their production."
An occupation tax upon the mining of iron ore has been
supported although substantially all the ore was shipped out
of the state and was put upon cars for that purpose by the same
operation that severed it from the soil. 23 'Wheat sold but wait" Jackson Mining Co. v. Auditor General (1875), 32 Mich. 488.
'Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co. (1922), 258 U. S. 50, 42 Sup. Ct. 244.
-Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. (1922), 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup.
Ct. 83.
1 Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord (1922), 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup.
Ct. 526.
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ing interstate shipment is subject to a tax as part of the general
mass of property of the state,24 and in the important case of
Coe v. ErroV2 5 it was likewise held that logs cut and hauled to
a landing place with the intention of later driving them down
a river to lumber mills located in another state, were subject to
taxation. The following excerpt from the opinion is often
quoted: "It seems to us untenable to hold that a crop or a herd
is exempt from taxation merely because it is by its owner, intended for exportation. If such were the rule, in many States
there would be nothing but the lands and real estate to bear
the taxes. Some of the Western states produce very little except
wheat and corn, most of which is intended for export; and so
of cotton in the Southern states. Certainly as long as these
products are on the lands which produce them, they are part
of the general property of the State. And so we think they
continue to be until they have entered upon their final journey
for leaving the State and going into another State."
A review of these cases shows that the Supreme Court of
the United States has kept a watchful eye on the states to see
that they do not use their taxing power for the purpose of
regulating the exportation of their natural products.
WATER

Analogous to the ease of wild game is that of water. The
same result is there reached in regard to the right of a state
to prohibit taking water from its streams and lakes for the
purpose of transporting it to other states. The leading case on
the subject is Hudson Coanty Water Co. v. McCarter,26 in which
a New Jersey statute making it unlawful "to transport or carry
through pipes, conduits, ditches or canals, the waters of any
fresh water lake, pond, brook, creek, river or streams of this
state into any other state for use therein," was held not an impairment of the commerce clause. The court's decision rests on
two grounds; (1) the power of the state to regulate the use of
water in its streams because of its importance as part of its
natural resources, and (2) the fact the common law denied the
riparian owner the right to divert water from a stream for
-"Bacon v. Illinois (1913), 227 U. S. 505, 33 Sup. Ct. 299.
(1886), 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475.
(1908), 209 U. S. 349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529.
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commercial purposes. Mr. Justice Holmes, however, expressed
it in broader terms. He said: "But we prefer to put the authority which cannot be denied to the State upon a broader
ground than that which was emphasized below, since in our
opinion it is independent of the more or less attenuated residuum
of title that the State may be said to possess .......
.It is
recognized that the State as quasi-sovereign and representative
of the public has a standing in court to protect the atmosphere,
the water and the forests within its territory, irrespective of
the assent or dissent of the' private owners of the land most
immediately concerned."
In a later case arising in New Jersey, Mr. Justice Butler,
in speaking for the court, said: "The State undoubtedly has
power, and it is its duty, to control and conserve the use of its
water resources for the benefit of all its inhabitants, and the
Act of 1907 was passed pursuant to the policy of the State to
prevent waste and to economize its water resources.''2 7 The
Nebraska court, in sustaining the right of the state to confine
the use of water taken from public streams for irrigation purposes to the confines of the state, said: "In this state water is
publici juris. Its use belongs to the public and is controlled by
the state in its sovereign capacity.''28 Still more emphatic
language to the same effect was used by a Federal judge in
Be.rgman v. Kea-rney,29 that the right of the state to regulate
the use of water can no longer be challenged. And the same
view was expressed in a still more recent Federal Court case.30
NATURAL GAS 8'
Nearly fifty years ago it was held that the natural gas was
so far a commercial commodity that a state could not prohibit
its transportation to another state by directI legislation;32 that
-'City of Trenton v. New Jersey (1923), 262 U. S. 182, 185, 43
Sup. Ct. 534.
. "Kirk v. State Board of Irrigation (1912), 90 Neb. 627, 134
N. W.
167.
, (1917), 241 Fed. 884, 893.
'*Middlesex Water Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners
(1926), 10 Fed. (2d) 519, 526.
31For an excellent discussion of the right of a state to regulate the
exportation of gas and .electricity, see an article on that subject by
Professor R. L. Howard in 18 Minn. L. Rev. 611-707.
"Jamieson v. Indiana Natural Gas Co. (1891), 128 Ind. 555, 28
N. E. 76.
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if it can be taken from the well and transported to another state
under a safe pressure, the state cannot prevent its transportation
by establishing one standard of pressure for gas piped to its
own citizens and another standard for that piped to citizens
of another state; 33 that where Congress has not as yet acted,
a state may make reasonable regulations over transportation of
natural gas for the protection of the life and health of its
citizens, provided such regulations do not directly affect interstate commerce;34 and that a state, since it controls the right
of eminent domain, may confine its use to companies supplying
citizens of its own state with natural gas. 35 However, when
the state of Indiana passed a statute making it unlawful to
transport natural gas outside its borders, its highest court of
appeal immediately held it unconstitutional. 36 In the course
of its opinion, the court said although the public has the ownership of wild animals before they are reduced to possession, it
does not have title or control over the gas in the ground but
that the qualified owners of the superincumbent lands have a
limited and qualified ownership in it to the entire exclusion of
the public. Likewise in 1912 when the Supreme Court of the
United States was called upon to decide the validity of a
Kansas statute forbidding the transportation of gas beyond the
state line, it held it a violation of the interstate commerce
37
clause.
The two most outstanding cases on the question of the right
of a state to prohibit the exportation of natural gas beyond its
boundaries are West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 38 and Pennsylvania v. West Virginia.3 9 In the former the state of Kansas
attempted to prevent the exportation of natural gas by denying
to foreign corporations the power of eminent domain or the
privilege of using the highways for laying the necessary pipe
lines. At the same time such rights were freely granted to com" Corwin v. Indiana & Ohio Oil, Gas and Mining Co. (1889), 120
Ind. 575, 22 N. E. 778.
"Benedict v. Columbus Construction Co. (1891), 49 N. J. Eq. 23,
23 Atl. 485.
1 Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Horless (1891), 131 Ind. 446, 29
N. E. 1062.

0 Manufacturers' Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas Co. (1900),
155 Ind. 545, 58 N. E. 706.
" Haskell v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 224 U. S. 217, 32 Sup. Ct. 442.
(1911), 221 U. S. 229, 31 Sup. Ct. 564.
- (1923), 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658.

K. L. J.-3
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panies restricting their enterprise within the confines of the
state. The Supreme Court of the United States, in frustrating
this effort to interfere with interstate commerce laid down the
rule that "no State, by the exercise of, or by the refusal to
exercise any or all of its powers, may substantially discriminate
against or directly regulate interstate commerce, or the right
to carry it on." While the court likened oil and gas to animals
ferae naturae, they pointed out that they were not identical as
in the case of oil and gas the owners of the surface cannot be
deprived of the right to reduce them to possession as they may
be in the case of wild animals. Also in the case of oil and gas,
only owners of the soil have the right to dispose of the same.
In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court followed
its holding in the West case and refused to allow a state to give
its own citizens a preference in natural gas produced in the
state. The purpose of the drafters of the Constitution was emphasized, namely, to make the resources of one state available
for the citizens of another state. Mr. Justice Holmes' view, set
forth in his dissenting opinion, has already been commented on
at the beginning of this article, that the statute sought to reach
the gas before it had entered into interstate commerce and was
therefore valid.
Two years prior to the Pennsylvania case the Supreme
Court had held a licensing fee on corporations engaged in collecting and transporting natural gas through pipe lines, invalid
as a burden on interstate commerce. 40 The state sought to levy
an occupation tax measured by the'volume of the traffic. Most
of the gas transported through the company's lines started at
points outside the state and was carried to points beyond the
state line. From these cases it is clear that a state cannot col'serve its natural gas for the use of its own citizens.
ELECTRICITY

It may be open to question whether the exportation of electric current from a state should be dealt with under the subject
being considered. While it is not a natural product or resource,
it would seem to be subject to the same limitations and rules as
natural gas in regard to the right of a state to prohibit its trans'0 United Gas & Fuel Co. v. Hallanan (1921), 25? U. S. 277, 42 Sup.
Ct. 105.
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portation beyond its boundaries. There are few decisions affecting the right to limit the exportation of electricity. In Public
Utility Commnission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric 6o.41, a Rhode
Island company contracted to deliver, at the state line, all the
electric current a Massachusetts company should require for a
period of twenty years. The Rhode Island commission authorized a new schedule of rates which affected the carrying out of
this contract. The increase was held invalid since it placed
a direct burden on interstate commerce.
Since, as we have seen under the Hudson County Water Co.
case, 42 a state can restrict the use of water to its own territory,
states have availed themselves of that power to restrain the ex43
poration of electric current generated on their water courses.
The statute considered in the Nebraska case already cited,44 was
of that nature. That statute provided that "the use of the
water of every natural stream within the State of Nebraska is
hereby dedicated to the people of the state for beneficial purposes, subject to the provisions of the following section." The
section referred to provided that the use for power purposes
should be deemed a public use and should never be alienated but
might be leased or developed as prescribed by law. The Nebraska court has sustained the validity of this act on more than
one occasion. 45 Maine, New Hampshire, West Virginia and
Wisconsin also have statutes to prevent or to limit the exportation of electricity, 4 6 but none of these laws have been passel
upon by our highest Court, nor have grants by state commissions to power companies conditioned upon the use of the
power generated in the states granting the franchises.
It may be argued that since hydroelectric power is a product
of the streams of a state and the courts concede the right of a
state to prohibit the exportation of the water from these streams,
it necessarily should follow that a state should have the right
to prevent taking from the state the electric power generated
- (1927), 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294.

Supra, n. 25.
"Howard: Gas & Electricity in Interstate Commerce, supra, n. 30.
"Hupra, n. 27.

'State v. Interstate Power Co. (1929), 118 Neb. 750, 226 N. W.
427; Northern Nebraska Power Co. v. Holt County (1931), 120 Neb.
724, 235 N. W. 92.
'"Maine Rev. Stat., 1930, Ch. 68, See. 1; N. H. Laws, 1929, Ch. LO6;
W. Va. Acts, 1929, Ch. 58; Wis. Stat., 1931, Sec. 31.27.
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by the waters of these same streams. This does not follow because the common law did not regard water in rivers and lakes
as subjeef to ownership before it was reduced to possession by
being put in some receptacle. Furthermore, a riparian owner
had no right to make water an article of commerce and sell it
for use off the land, even though he gained title to it by putting
it in a pipe or receptacle. -Whereas electric current has always
been regarded as something that is marketable and therefore
subject to the rules of commerce. It is possible that the reason
why wild animals and water are both subject to the control of
the state where found, is a historical matter. Possibly, if the
question of the right of a state to prevent their transportation
beyond its borders were to come before the courts today for
the first time, a different result would be reached in each case.
The tendency has been more and more to break down the idea
of fettering property rights by state lines.
The case of natural gas bears out this contention. In most
states where natural gas is a natural resource, it is regarded as
not subject to ownership while in place in the underlying pools.
It is not subject to ownership until pumped into pipes and thus
reduced to possession.4 7 Nevertheless, after gas is 9nce reduced
to ownership, we have seen that it is subject to commerce and
the state cannot conserve it for its own citizens. If a state is
n6t allowed to so restrict the use of natural gas, there seems
no reason to believe the Supreme Court of the United States
will make a different rule in regard to electric current.
It does not seem necessary to consider whether a state may
limit the exportation of the lumber from its forests, the coal and
iron from its mines, nor the grain from its fields. This is not
as strong a case for state control as that of natural gas, where
the power is denied. Furthermore, the court has inferentially
denied that right in its opinion in the Heisler case.48
CONCLUSION

A survey of the decisions bearing upon the question whether
a state may restrict or prohibit the exportation of its natural
products shows that only in two instances does a state have such
a right. It may conserve for its own citizens fish and game
"1Summers: Oil & Gas, 128.
4 F4
p, n.25.
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reduced to possession within its limits and it may control the
use of water in its streams and lakes. It is clear that in the case
of natural gas and mineral resources, a state cannot prevent
them from being transported to other states. In regard to electric current generated by the use of water power on their
streams, states are today putting restrictions on its use beyond
their borders, but it still remains for the Supreme Couit of the
United States to pass upon the validity of these restrictions.
At first thought, the line drawn by the courts between wild
animals and water on the one hand and natural gas and other
natural products on the other; may seem arbitrary. The position of Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in the
Pennsylvania case, that the state may control natural gas before
it has entered into interstate commerce, seems sound; but the
result reached by the majority of the Court seems the more
desirable and more in harmony with the purpose of the commerce clause, namely: that any one state should have the benefit
of any natural product of any other state. Is not this line based
upon the commercial importance of the product? In the early
development of our law game fish and game did not figure very
large in the interchange of products between the states. At the
time the business of market hunting was at its height, the conservation movement was started and had the tendency to discourage the idea that game fish and game birds were proper
articles of commerce. Laws passed for the conservation of them
were sustained. Furthermore, ownership of wild animals under
the common law, was not recognized until they were reduced to
possession. The state, under its police power, could, prevent
the capture of fish and game during limited periods or for all
time, and consequently it could fix the conditions under which
they could be taken. Ownership in water, too, was not recognized at common law unless it were reduced to possession and it
did not acquire a commercial importance before the law became
crystallized that states could prevent its exportation. On the
other hand, natural gas and electricity have always been regarded as commercially important, -consequently they properly
come within the purview of the commerce clause of the Constitution and states cannot or should not prevent their transportation beyond their own borders.

